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Generative AI: a freeze on youth hiring in exposed occupations

An analysis of young people's labor market entry based on labor turnover data

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KEY POINTS

— Since November 2022, hires of 21-29-year-olds on open-ended contracts have fallen by 28.3% in the occupations most exposed to generative AI, compared with 7.5% in the least exposed occupations.

— Separations from open-ended contracts are also falling, by 23% in the most exposed occupations compared with 6% in the least exposed. As hires fall more than departures, the balance between the two shrinks by about 2,700 per month and workforce renewal slows: the market is freezing for young people in exposed occupations.

— The hiring gap between the most exposed and the least exposed occupations decreases with age. While it exceeds 20 points among 21-29-year-olds, it is below 4 points after age 50. It persists when fixed-term contracts are added to open-ended contracts (23 points among 21-29-year-olds).

— Among young developers, hires on open-ended contracts fall by 42%, compared with 11% in less exposed occupations. Excluding developers, the gap between the most and the least exposed occupations remains 17 points.

— Firms that report using AI intensively hire relatively fewer young people on open-ended contracts, without their total workforce departing clearly from that of other firms.

In the United States, employment of young people in the occupations most exposed to generative artificial intelligence has been declining since 2022, relative to other occupations. It is also declining relative to older employees. This finding has revived an old fear, that of workers being replaced by technology, a fear now accompanied by a new element: the first affected would be those entering the labor market, young people. Indeed, young workers perform more repetitive, codifiable tasks, which language models carry out satisfactorily, and they have not yet accumulated the experience that makes an employee hard to replace. The results obtained elsewhere in the world nevertheless remain mixed: in Norway and Denmark, the measured effects on aggregate employment are small or undetectable[1]. What about France? In the short run, a technological shock does not necessarily affect the level of employment. It can first alter flows, by reducing hiring or changing the pace of departures, without initially changing the number of employees in post. We therefore study the labor turnover data (mouvements de main-d'œuvre, MMO), a database that records every hire and every separation in private-sector establishments, from January 2019 to March 2026[2]. Each quarter, more than half a million open-ended contracts (CDI) are signed within the scope of the study.[3]

To link each movement to the degree of AI exposure of the occupation, we build a new index from the Répertoire opérationnel des métiers et des emplois (ROME, the French repertoire of occupations), maintained by France Travail (France's public employment service). The 1,584 profiles of the repertoire describe the skills used in each occupation. A language model assesses, for each of the 16,740 skills, how capable generative AI is of performing the task in question, then penalizes this score according to the tacit expertise and the physical or relational presence it requires[4]. Occupations are then ranked into five quintiles, from the least exposed (Q1) to the most exposed (Q5).

The most exposed quintile brings together professions that produce, process or format information, whereas the least exposed groups occupations of physical presence or direct personal contact (Table 1). The index measures what the technology can do with respect to the tasks of an occupation. It measures neither the actual use of AI nor the probability that a job disappears.

[1] Brynjolfsson, Chandar and Chen (2026) for the United States, based on ADP payroll data; Hernæs and Kostøl (2026) for Norway; Humlum and Vestergaard (2025) for Denmark.

[2] The MMO are built from the déclarations sociales nominatives, the monthly payroll declarations filed by employers (Dares, 2022; Dares is the labor ministry's statistics directorate). They cover private-sector establishments in metropolitan France, excluding agriculture, temporary agency work and private household employers. Entries and exits of the same employee in the same establishment within the same month are excluded. Age is computed at the date of the movement.

[3] This work was carried out in collaboration with the Banque de France, which is publishing a post on the same topic. The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors alone and not of the Banque de France. The method and the full set of results are detailed in LIFT Working Paper 2026-02 (Palladino et al., 2026).

[4] Each skill of ROME 4.0 (April-June 2026 version) is scored from 0 to 5 by Claude Opus 4.7 agents, taking as reference the capabilities of generative AI in April 2026, according to the autonomy with which AI can perform it (D1), the tacit expertise it requires (D4) and the physical or relational friction it involves (D5). The score D1 × (1 - D4/5) × (1 - D5/5) is averaged by profile, then converted into PCS (the French occupational classification) using the Dares correspondence table. The quintiles are built on the 310 PCS present in the MMO, without employment weighting. The index extends Bergeaud (2024).

Table 1. Examples of occupations by exposure quintile

Quintile	Examples of professions
Q1, least exposed	General care nurses; nursing assistants; childminders; skilled building maintenance workers
Q2	Salaried hairdressers; social service assistants; unskilled material handlers; construction machinery operators
Q3	Legal professionals; training specialists (managers); hotel reception staff; skilled maintenance mechanics
Q4	Quality control engineers and managers; bank sales managers; photographers; typesetting and printing workers
Q5, most exposed	Word processing operators; interpreters and translators; journalists; economic, financial and commercial research managers; bank operations technicians

Notes: Each quintile comprises between 61 and 63 professions, counted one by one and without employment weighting, so that a quintile does not correspond to one fifth of employees. Source: authors' calculations based on ROME 4.0 and the Dares correspondence table.


To assess the actual use of artificial intelligence tools, we match these data with the spring 2026 edition of the Banque de France monthly business survey, in which firms were asked about the intensity of their AI use. About 6,000 responding firms can be found in the MMO, of which about 600 report intensive use.

These results remain descriptive. The period studied is also one of rapid monetary tightening, a post-Covid correction in the digital sector, the spread of remote work and the rise of apprenticeship. The comparison between occupations neutralizes none of these factors, an issue addressed in the last part of this document. Finally, the series concern flows, that is, the hires and separations of each month. They do not tell how many young people hold these jobs at a given date. This number, which is a stock, is the subject of an ongoing analysis based on the Base tous salariés of Insee (the national statistics institute), which records all salaried jobs every year.

In exposed occupations, hiring of young people on open-ended contracts has been dropping since late 2022

Among 21-29-year-olds, the number of hires on open-ended contracts in the most exposed occupations is, in March 2026, 28.3% below its level of November 2022, the month in which ChatGPT became available to the public. In the least exposed occupations, the decline is 7.5%. The gap thus reaches 20.8 points (Figure 1). Relative to their trend level of November 2022, about 22,000 hires per month, this drop represents about 6,200 fewer hires on open-ended contracts each month in the occupations of the most exposed quintile, of which about 4,600 beyond the decline observed in the least exposed occupations. Over a year, this represents about 75,000 fewer open-ended contracts for 21-29-year-olds alone.

Figure 1. Since late 2022, hiring of young people on open-ended contracts has been dropping in the most exposed occupations



Notes: Monthly series, seasonally adjusted and smoothed (Hodrick-Prescott filter, λ = 1,000), relative to November 2022. A value of -10 corresponds to a 10% decrease relative to November 2022. Coverage: hires on open-ended contracts in the private sector covered by the MMO, excluding agriculture, temporary agency work and private household employers, metropolitan France. Source: Dares, MMO; authors' exposure index.

The gap between the hiring dynamics of the occupations of the first and last quintiles decreases with age: 20.8 points among 21-29-year-olds, 18.6 among 30-39-year-olds, 15.3 among 40-49-year-olds, then 3.8 after age 50. Employees at the start of their careers therefore undergo the strongest adjustment, and experience seems to protect older workers. The gap nevertheless remains substantial up to age 49, so that the decline is not limited to new entrants. It comes almost entirely from exposed occupations, whose volume of hires on open-ended contracts decreases by about a quarter at all ages before 50 (28.3% at ages 21-29, 27.4% at ages 30-39, 23.9% at ages 40-49) and by 12.5% beyond. In weakly exposed occupations, the decline lies between 7 and 9%, regardless of age. At a given age, the comparison between quintiles neutralizes what the hiring cycle has in common across all occupations, but not the shocks specific to exposed occupations, discussed in the last part. The pattern presented here is also found for all hires, short contracts included, as Figure 3 shows below. Among 21-29-year-olds, the intermediate quintiles fall between the two extremes: Q2 declines like Q1 (7.5%), Q3 and Q4 by about 15 and 16%.

Before November 2022, the quintiles follow similar trajectories, marked by the collapse of hiring in spring 2020 and then by a rebound. This similarity does not guarantee that the two groups of occupations would have continued to move together without the arrival of generative AI, but it shows that the divergence observed afterwards does not extend an older gap. The results remain unchanged when the choices made in processing the series are modified[5].

[5] The results are qualitatively stable when the smoothing parameter is varied, when the two-sided filter is replaced by a recursive version, when the seasonal adjustment procedure is changed, or when a twelve-month moving average, linear trends estimated before 2022 or a specification in levels is used.

An asymmetric freeze: departures that also decline, but less strongly than entries

Separations from open-ended contracts also decline in the most exposed occupations. Among 21-29-year-olds, they stand in March 2026 at a level about 23% lower than in November 2022 in the most exposed quintile, compared with 6% in the least exposed, a gap of about 17 points (Figure 2). Relative to their November 2022 level, this decline represents about 3,500 fewer separations each month in the most exposed quintile. As for hires, the contrast fades at intermediate ages and disappears among the oldest.


Young employees in exposed occupations therefore leave their jobs less often, while firms hire fewer of them. The market is freezing, asymmetrically, because hires decline more than departures and the balance between the two shrinks by about 2,700 movements per month among 21-29-year-olds in the most exposed quintile. Turnover slows and the renewal of the workforce weakens.

Part of the decline in departures may be mechanical. Terminations are frequent in the first months of a contract, so fewer hires mean fewer recent employees, who are more likely to leave. The timing points in this direction, since the gap in separations only widens from 2024, about a year after that of hires (Figure 2). Beyond this mechanical effect, the decline is probably due to a change in behavior: in a market where job offers are becoming scarcer, employees change employers less often.

This dynamic is consistent with a gradual reorganization of employment in exposed occupations. A firm that entrusts AI with part of the tasks usually assigned to beginners does not need to lay off workers; it only needs to hire less and not replace some departures. French labor law probably favors this mode of adjustment, since terminating an open-ended contract is more regulated in France than in the United States. The effects of AI exposure on job vacancies also seem larger in countries where employment protection is strictest[6].

[6] OECD (2026); Klein Teeselink and Carey (2026).

Figure 2. **Among young people in exposed occupations, departures decline later and less than hires**



Notes: Gap between the series of the most exposed and the least exposed quintiles, each seasonally adjusted, smoothed and relative to November 2022. Coverage: hires on and separations from open-ended contracts of 21-29-year-olds, private sector covered by the MMO. Source: Dares, MMO; authors' exposure index.

The decline is not just a shift toward short contracts

Young people often enter employment through a fixed-term contract (CDD). If firms in exposed occupations had simply replaced open-ended contracts with fixed-term contracts, the observed decline would then reflect a mere change in the form of hiring. Yet, all contracts combined, hires of 21-29-year-olds decline by 22.1% between November 2022 and March 2026 in the most exposed quintile, while they increase by 1.0% in the least exposed. The gap between the two reaches 23.1 points, more than for open-ended contracts alone (Figure 3). The decline measured on open-ended contracts therefore does concern entry into stable employment, and it survives once short contracts are taken into account.


For fixed-term contracts alone, the gap between quintiles reaches nearly 19 points among 21-29-year-olds and 13 to 16 points at other ages. It partly extends an older movement, however. After growing faster than those of weakly exposed occupations until mid-2021, fixed-term hires in exposed occupations had started to decline in relative terms more than a year before November 2022, and separations from fixed-term contracts follow the same pattern. The open-ended contract series, by contrast, followed similar trajectories until late 2022, which makes them the most reliable measure of the drop.

The age profile is the same as for open-ended contracts, with even larger gaps. The gap between Q5 and Q1 thus reaches 23.1 points among 21-29-year-olds, 22.0 among 30-39-year-olds, 19.6 among 40-49-year-olds, then 10.6 after age 50. Taking fixed-term contracts into account therefore removes neither the observed decline nor its shape: here again, in the most exposed occupations, hiring contracts at all ages up to around 50.

The gap measured on total hires exceeds the gap observed for each type of contract taken separately, because the share of short contracts varies strongly from one quintile to another. In weakly exposed

occupations, where fixed-term contracts dominate hiring, hires remain at their November 2022 level, or even slightly exceed it. Conversely, exposed occupations, in which open-ended contracts weigh more, follow more closely the series describing open-ended contracts alone. Part of the total gap thus reflects the difference in contractual composition between quintiles.

Figure 3. The decline in hiring in exposed occupations withstands the inclusion of fixed-term contracts



Notes: Gap between the most exposed and the least exposed quintiles, series seasonally adjusted, smoothed and relative to November 2022, value for March 2026. Total hires are obtained by adding, in levels, hires on open-ended and fixed-term contracts in each age × quintile × month cell, before taking logarithms, seasonal adjustment, the Hodrick-Prescott filter and normalization. Coverage: hires in the private sector covered by the MMO, excluding agriculture, temporary agency work and private household employers. Source: Dares, MMO; authors' exposure index.

Developers on the front line, but not alone

A quintile groups occupations whose qualifications and working conditions have little in common. We therefore isolate an occupation whose exposure is particularly direct: software developers and IT engineers, who weigh heavily in the flows of the most exposed quintile. Among 21-29-year-olds, their hires on open-ended contracts stand in March 2026 at a level about 42% lower than in November 2022, compared with 11% for the occupations of the first four quintiles, a gap close to 31 points (Figure 4). The gap narrows with age without disappearing, and the slowdown also affects experienced developers.


This is the clearest case, and also the hardest to attribute to AI. The digital sector hired massively in 2021 and 2022, then reorganized when rising interest rates dried up the financing of technology firms. In the euro area, however, the weakness of employment in the information technology sector exceeds what the dynamics of the sector itself can explain[7].

It remains to be seen what share of the gap between quintiles is due to developers. In Norway, employment of young developers falls by about 18%, while the most exposed quintile does not

[7] Chaloupka and Dias da Silva (2026).

decline significantly relative to the least exposed (Hernæs and Kostøl, 2026). In France, developers accounted in 2022 for a little over a fifth of hires of young people on open-ended contracts in the most exposed quintile. Without them, these hires have declined by 24.5% since November 2022, compared with 7.5% in the least exposed quintile. The gap therefore remains 17 points, compared with 20.8 with them: IT explains less than a fifth of the gap, and the decline affects all exposed occupations.

Figure 4. Hiring of developers declines at all ages



Notes: Software developers and IT engineers defined by PCS codes 388A and 478A. The comparison group comprises the occupations of the first four exposure quintiles. Series processed as in Figure 1. Source: Dares, MMO; authors' exposure index.

Firms that adopt AI hire fewer young people, with no visible decline in their total workforce

The degree of exposure of an occupation says nothing about the actual use of AI. Matching these data with those of the Banque de France survey makes it possible to bring the analysis to the firm level and to study the intensity of their AI adoption. Firms that report intensive use of AI in 2026 were already hiring, between 2019 and 2022, in occupations clearly more exposed than those that report not using it. The difference in exposure between the occupations into which they hired is 0.7 standard deviation. It falls to about 0.2 standard deviation within a given industry, but remains significant[8]. Actual AI adoption therefore depends on the nature of the jobs the firm was already using beforehand, including within the same industry.

We then compare, quarter by quarter, the hires of intensive AI users with those of other firms in the same industry, neutralizing permanent differences between firms. The comparison group includes firms that use AI in a limited or experimental way, which tends to attenuate the gaps. After the fourth quarter of 2022, hires of young people on open-ended contracts drop among intensive AI users, with a gap of -0.19 to -0.29 log points depending on the quarter of 2025, a relative decline of 17 to 25% (Figure 5). Among older employees, the gaps remain small and rarely significant. Before 2023, the coefficients for young people are not significant, but they rise from about -0.13 in early 2021 to

[8] Average exposure of the firm's hires over 2019-2022, standardized; industry at the one-digit level of the NAF (the French classification of activities); 4,185 firms. Limited and experimental uses lie between the two extremes.

slightly positive values in late 2021 and spring 2022, so that part of the gap may reflect the reversal of a period of strong hiring.


Within intensive AI users alone, hires decline more in the occupations of the most exposed quintile than in the other occupations of the same firm (Figure 6). The gap fluctuates around zero before 2023, then widens from the second quarter of 2023. It reaches -0.4 to -0.46 log points in the first half of 2025, about a third fewer hires, before narrowing at the end of the period, when it is no longer significant. As the comparison concerns occupations within the same firm, for a given industry and quarter, it cannot be attributed to a demand shock specific to the firm.

Firms that use AI intensively therefore hire relatively fewer young people (Figure 5), and their hires decline mainly in the most exposed occupations (Figure 6). We infer that the decline concerns first of all young people hired in these occupations. This conclusion remains an inference, because the data available at the firm level do not cross age and occupation.

The total workforce of intensive AI users does not diverge in a statistically clear way from that of other firms. This does not prove the absence of an effect, because the estimates drift toward -2 to -3% in late 2025 and a decline of this magnitude cannot be distinguished from zero with the precision available to us. A decline in the hiring of young people, which concerns only a fraction of employees, may long precede a visible effect on the total workforce. This result is therefore compatible with the positive relationship between AI adoption and employment observed in French firms between 2017 and 2020 (Aghion et al., 2025), which concerned AI in the broad sense.


These results nevertheless come with a caveat. To measure the intensity of AI use, we rely on a report from early 2026, whereas the hiring gaps appear as early as 2023. We cannot assert that the intensive users of 2026 were already using AI when their hiring began to decline. The relationship may of course reflect the effect of marked adoption, but it may also stem from a selection effect specific to the firms that would later adopt AI, for example because they were already reorganizing their hiring. Insee's survey on information and communication technologies, which specifies the year of adoption, will make it possible to settle the question in part.

Figure 5. **Firms that use AI intensively have been hiring fewer young people on open-ended contracts since 2023**



Notes: Poisson model with firm fixed effects and industry × quarter fixed effects, coefficients in log points. Groups are defined according to the use reported in early 2026, and not according to the date of adoption, intensive users being compared with all other firms. Balanced panel of 6,293 firms, from the first quarter of 2021 to the first quarter of 2026. The estimates cover about 6,000 firms for 21-29-year-olds and 5,500 for those aged 50 and over, firms with no hires in the age group being excluded. Bars: 95% confidence intervals, standard errors clustered by firm. Source: Dares, MMO; Banque de France monthly business survey; authors' calculations.

Figure 6. **In firms that use AI intensively, hiring declines more in the most exposed occupations**



Notes: Poisson model with firm, exposure quintile and industry × quarter fixed effects, coefficients in log points. Coverage: 541 firms reporting intensive use of AI and matched to the MMO. Bars: 95% confidence intervals, standard errors clustered by firm. Source: Dares, MMO; Banque de France monthly business survey; authors' calculations.

France compared with other countries

The results available abroad do not converge. The differences observed are due as much to the data used as to the characteristics of the labor markets studied.

In the United States, Brynjolfsson, Chandar and Chen (2026) observe a relative decline in the employment of young people in exposed occupations. Their study uses a balanced panel of client firms of the payroll processor ADP, a rich database that makes it possible to follow employment levels month by month, but which covers neither the entire private sector nor the reallocations linked to firm creations and closures.

In Norway, Hernæs and Kostøl (2026) measure a decline of about 18% in the employment of young developers, but no significant gap between the most exposed and the least exposed quintiles. The contrast with France may be due to the composition of the quintiles or to the labor market itself, but not to the weight of IT, since the French gap persists excluding developers.

In Denmark, Humlum and Vestergaard (2025) mainly observe a reorganization of tasks, around the integration and supervision of AI. They detect, however, no effect on earnings or on hours worked, among employees as in establishments, and rule out an effect larger than 2% two years after the launch of ChatGPT. These measures concern the volume of work and not the hiring of young people, which is the channel studied here.

Our study of the French case stands out in three ways. The scope covers all private-sector establishments, including firms that appear and those that disappear. Hires and separations are followed separately, which makes it possible to see that both decline at the same time, whereas the change in employment alone would show only their difference. Finally, we cross the exposure of occupations to AI with the use that firms report, whereas most work on the subject stops at the first dimension.

Three alternative explanations: cyclical effects, remote work, apprenticeship

Three concurrent developments may produce all or part of the observed gaps, independently of AI.

The first relates to the labor market cycle. Young people are more sensitive to a slowdown in hiring, and the period studied follows a time of strong job creation in 2021 and 2022. In the euro area, recent youth employment remains broadly consistent with the usual cyclical dynamics[9]. Moreover, the rise in the ECB deposit rate, from -0.5% to 4% between July 2022 and September 2023, weighed on investment and hiring in technology-sector activities, which are precisely where exposed occupations are concentrated. The cyclical dynamics, however, struggle to explain why the gap we observe narrows sharply among older workers within the same occupations.

The observed decrease in the gap with age is compatible with the hypothesis that the hiring freeze is explained by the specific nature of early-career tasks. It does not, however, make it possible to establish it formally. Another hypothesis, that of a general decline in demand in exposed occupations, could lead to a similar situation, because most hiring concerns young people and their hiring is more sensitive to market conditions. Depending on the interpretation chosen, the medium-term scenario is markedly different. In the first case, junior positions are undergoing a profound redefinition. If, on the contrary, the slowdown in hiring is first a matter of economic conditions, these positions will simply return with activity.

The second alternative explanatory factor is the rise of remote work. Occupations exposed to AI are also those suited to remote work, and the link between AI exposure and the decline in the share of juniors in hiring weakens sharply when this dimension is taken into account[10]. The two explanations may combine. By pushing firms to codify their practices in documents and digital procedures, remote

[9] Chaloupka and Dias da Silva (2026). For policy rates, ECB (2024).

[10] Lambert and Schindler (2026).

work may have made these tasks easier to automate, and the firms that relied on it more subsequently adopted generative AI faster[11].

Finally, the third notable development that could explain our observations is that of apprenticeship. The number of apprentices more than doubled, from about 430,000 in 2017 to more than a million at the end of 2023, and this expansion was concentrated in higher education, notably in business, management and IT, and therefore in exposed occupations. Some of the young people no longer seen entering these occupations on open-ended contracts may be entering them as apprentices. In the public file of the Base tous salariés, among 21-29-year-olds employed in an occupation of the most exposed quintile, the share of apprentices rises from 6% at the end of 2019 to 10% at the end of 2023[12]. If this channel weighs heavily, part of the decline in open-ended contracts then reflects a shift toward apprenticeship. In that case, the issue becomes first of all the hiring of these apprentices at the end of their contract.

Implications: monitoring the entry points

Even if AI has a real effect on flows into and out of employment, its impact on stocks, the volumes of employment, could remain hard to observe for several years. The usual indicators, employment rates or headcounts by occupation, which focus on these volumes, will react late. Monitoring hires by age, contract and occupation offers an earlier signal, provided it is published regularly with a stable exposure classification, in order to distinguish a lasting shift from a cyclical trough. The publication of the Base tous salariés for 2024 will make it possible to check whether the freeze in flows is already starting to show up in stocks.

The long-term issue concerns the career ladder. Entry-level positions also serve to train, through practice, the experienced professionals of tomorrow. If AI takes over the tasks through which beginners learned their trade, firms save in the short run, but the accumulation of experience suffers. The automation of junior tasks can thus reduce long-run output when the cost savings it brings remain modest, precisely because it removes the first rung of the ladder[13]. The cost of the freeze observed today would then be measured in a decade, by the scarcity of experienced profiles in exposed occupations.

As regards youth employment policies, two levers stand out. Apprenticeship may already be playing a cushioning role, and its effectiveness will be judged by the hiring rate of apprentices at the end of their contract in exposed occupations. Employers, public and private alike, have an interest in redefining entry-level positions around what AI does poorly, such as supervising outputs, customer relations or exercising judgment on atypical cases, and in preserving on-the-job training paths. A firm that stops hiring beginners shifts the problem onto its hiring of experienced employees.

Finally, these results call for distinguishing two questions that are often conflated in public debate. Knowing whether AI destroys jobs requires looking at the level of employment, and French data do not currently make it possible to assert that such destruction is under way. Knowing whether AI is closing the entry points into employment is, by contrast, a question of flows, and this is where the first signs appear. The first question relates to economic conditions and productivity, the second to the labor market integration of young people and to training through work. These two issues call for different responses, in terms of monitoring instruments and public policy.

[11] Deming (2026); Schubert (2026).

[12] Insee (2025) for the number of apprentices. Share of apprentices: authors' calculation based on the Postes detailed file of the Base tous salariés (Insee, 1/12 sample), private-sector employees in post on December 31, workplace in metropolitan France, quintiles recomputed on the PCS of the file.

[13] Asriyan, Reichardt and Shelegia (2026).

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The Laboratory of Innovation and Future Transformations (LIFT) is a research laboratory at HEC Paris that studies the impact of artificial intelligence on firms, employment, innovation and growth. It brings together academic researchers and practitioners across six research areas, produces original data and regularly publishes notes, studies and indicators for public and private decision-makers.

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